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Abstract 
Research suggests that people sometimes perceive a relationship between stimuli when no such 
relationship exists (i.e., illusory correlation). Illusory-correlation effects are thought to play a 
central role in the formation of stereotypes and evaluations of minority versus majority groups, 
often leading to less favorable impressions of minorities. Extant theories differ in terms of 
whether they attribute illusory-correlation effects to processes operating during learning (belief 
formation) or measurement (belief expression), and whether different evaluation measures should 
be differentially sensitive to illusory-correlation effects. Past research found mixed evidence for 
dissociative effects of illusory-correlation manipulations on measures of implicit (i.e., automatic) 
and explicit (i.e., controlled) evaluation. Four high-powered studies obtained illusory-correlation 
effects on explicit evaluations, but not implicit evaluations probed with an Implicit Association 
Test, Evaluative Priming Task, and Affect Misattribution Procedure. The results are consistent 
with theories that attribute illusory-correlation effects to processes during belief expression. 
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Illusory-Correlation Effects on Implicit and Explicit Evaluation 
Research suggests that beliefs influence behavior, even when these beliefs are erroneous 
(e.g., in consumer research: Geraerts et al., 2008; in politics: Wells, Reedy, Gastil, & Lee, 2009). 
In social psychology, the effect of false beliefs on behavior is predominantly studied in research 
on social stereotypes (i.e., beliefs about the traits of members of social categories). It is widely 
assumed that stereotypical beliefs can lead people to act in a biased manner towards certain social 
groups (Wheeler & Petty, 2001). It is therefore important to know how these beliefs might arise 
and what underlies their impact.  
Illusory-correlation effects 
One type of beliefs that are thought to contribute to social stereotypes are illusory-
correlation beliefs, which refer to beliefs about the contiguous relationship between two variables 
(e.g., the presence of social category members and the presence of valenced events) when no 
such relationship exists. In a foundational study by Hamilton and Gifford (1976), participants 
read a series of statements describing either desirable or undesirable behaviors performed by the 
members of two fictitious social groups. More statements were presented for one group (majority 
group) than for the other group (minority group) but, importantly, the overall proportion of 
positive to negative behavioral statements was the same for both groups. When more positive 
than negative behavioral statements were presented for both groups, an illusory-correlation effect 
was observed such that participants overestimated the proportion of negative statements about the 
minority compared to the majority group. Conversely, when more negative than positive 
behavioral statements were presented for both groups, participants overestimated the proportion 
of positive statements about the minority compared to the majority group. The authors argued 
that illusory-correlation effects might also arise in real life. Because negative behaviors tend to be 
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less frequent than positive behaviors in most real-world contexts, people may have a tendency to 
form negative stereotypes of minorities even when their behavior does not differ from the 
behavior of majorities. Later studies have established the robustness of illusory-correlation 
effects and found that effects on proportion estimates transfer to other stimulus-related behavior 
such as social group evaluation (for reviews, see Fiedler & Walther, 2004; Mullen & Johnson, 
1990).  
Explanations of illusory-correlation effects 
Broadly, two different classes of explanations have been proposed for illusory-correlation 
effects. One type of explanations attributes effects of illusory-correlation manipulations to 
processes operating during learning (i.e., belief formation). For example, Hamilton and Gifford’s 
(1976) distinctiveness account postulates that uncommon events are more salient than frequent 
events. Due to stronger memory encoding of salient, infrequent events (e.g., negative behavior of 
minority members when negative behavior is less frequent than positive behavior; Johnson & 
Mullen, 1994), people will overestimate the frequency of these events, which leads to illusory-
correlation effects. Another explanation that refers to learning-related processes indicates that 
there are more learning trials for frequent behavior of the majority group (Fiedler, 1991). During 
learning, people might extract information more robustly from a larger sample of exemplars, such 
that frequent information about the majority group is more strongly represented in memory (there 
is less information loss). Participants might draw on this difference when asked to report 
proportion judgments or evaluations for the two groups. 
A different perspective is provided by explanations of illusory-correlation effects that 
draw on processes during measurement (i.e., belief expression; e.g., Klauer & Meiser, 2000; 
Eder, Fiedler, & Hamm-Eder, 2011). When asked to report proportion judgments or evaluations 
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for two groups, people may have a tendency to meaningfully distinguish between the groups 
(Berndsen & Spears, 1997). However, due to limitations in memory, participants may not 
remember to which group some of the positive and negative behaviors referred, and therefore 
engage in guessing processes. Evidence suggests that, in a typical illusory-correlation paradigm, 
participants choose the majority group with a higher probability when guessing the origin of a 
positive behavior and with a smaller probability when guessing the origin of a negative behavior 
(Bulli & Primi, 2006). One reason for this might be that participants estimate information by 
drawing on fast and frugal heuristics. They may predominantly use the heuristic that things that 
occur less often (i.e., statements about minority group members and statements about negative 
behavior) belong together, leading to the typical error in proportion estimates and evaluations.  
Effects of illusory-correlation manipulations on different behavioral measures 
An important distinction between these two classes of theories lies in the prediction of 
differential effects of illusory-correlation manipulations on different measures of evaluation. 
Theories that attribute illusory-correlation effects to processes that occur during learning (e.g., 
Hamilton & Gifford, 1976) assume that participants incorrectly represent the proportion of 
valenced information. Because this representation should transfer to any behavior for which this 
proportion is relevant, these theories do not distinguish different ways in which illusory 
correlations impact different types of behavior. Once represented in memory, the proportion of 
valenced statements is transferred to behavior for which this information is relevant irrespective 
of how these types of behavior are measured.  
In contrast, theories that attribute illusory-correlation effects to processes that occur 
during measurement assume that different behavioral measures can be differentially sensitive to 
illusory-correlation effects. For example, guessing bias theories (e.g., Klauer & Meiser, 2000) 
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predict that dissociations could be observed on measures that evoke different guessing processes 
or heuristics. 
Ratliff and Nosek (2010) provided preliminary evidence that responses on different 
evaluation measures can be differentially affected by illusory correlations. In two experiments, 
participants read more positive than negative behavioral statements about members of two 
fictitious social groups (i.e., Niffians and Laapians). As in a typical illusory-correlation paradigm, 
there were more statements about the majority group compared to the minority group, but the 
proportion of positive to negative information was identical for the two groups. In line with prior 
research, participants reported a preference for the majority over the minority group on self-
reported liking ratings. In contrast, no such preference was observed on an Implicit Association 
Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  
Ratliff and Nosek (2010) explained their findings in terms of dual-process theories of 
evaluation (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), postulating that the IAT 
registers implicit attitudes that reflect automatic activation of associations between 
representations in memory (e.g., between representations of a social group and positivity), 
whereas self-report measures register explicit attitudes that reflect belief-based processes. 
Illusory-correlation manipulations might require belief-based processes and therefore influence 
self-report measures of evaluation but not the IAT (Ratliff & Nosek, 2010). However, this 
interpretation is based on the assumption that dissociations between measures of evaluation can 
be interpreted as proxies for functionally distinct learning mechanisms and their resulting 
representations-an assumption that has been challenged by an accumulating body of evidence 
(see Corneille & Mertens, in press; De Houwer, 2014; Gawronski, De Houwer, & Sherman, in 
press; Kurdi & Dunham, in press; Van Dessel, Gawronski, & De Houwer, 2019).  
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In light of this evidence, the most parsimonious interpretation of Ratliff and Nosek’s 
(2010) finding is that illusory correlation effects result from processes operating during 
measurement (belief expression) rather than learning (belief formation). For example, guessing-
based theories predict dissociative effects on different measures of evaluation when these 
measures are differentially sensitive to guessing-related processes. Notably, guessing the source 
of behavioral information might require evaluation under optimal conditions such as sufficient 
time and attention or the intention to provide an adequate (evaluative) response. For instance, 
evaluation measures for which guessing the differential proportion of valenced information is 
relevant should show stronger illusory-correlation effects. In contrast, measures in which 
evaluative behavior occurs under some of the conditions of automaticity (i.e., automatic or 
implicit evaluation measures: see De Houwer et al., 2013) might show little evidence for illusory-
correlation effects. The IAT is a measure in which evaluation is automatic in the sense that 
evaluative responding is faster and less controlled than in a self-report measure (De Houwer et 
al., 2009). Hence, guessing-based theories would predict only weak or absent illusory-correlation 
effects on the IAT. 
However, findings by Carraro and colleagues (2014) give reason to be cautious about the 
conclusion that illusory correlation effects result from measurement-related rather than learning-
related processes. Different from Ratliff and Nosek (2010), Cararro et al. obtained strong illusory 
correlation effects on the IAT. In this study, participants were shown 39 sentences each 
describing a behavior performed by a member of one of two groups (Group A and B). Though 
the ratio of positive to negative behaviors was identical for both groups, IAT scores reflected a 
preference for Group A, the group for which participants had seen twice the number of sentences. 
The discrepancy between the findings of Carraro et al. (2014) and Ratliff and Nosek 
(2010) is important, because it obscures whether illusory-correlation manipulations affect IAT 
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scores, and thus whether illusory-correlation effects arise from learning-related or measurement-
related processes. Because both studies included a confound that is unrelated to illusory 
correlations, this question is even more difficult to answer. In both studies, participants saw 
positive statements more frequently than negative behavior, but there was no control condition in 
which negative statements were presented more frequently than positive statements.1 Because 
illusory-correlation effects should lead to a reversed preference for the minority over the majority 
group, it cannot be ruled out that the preference reported for the majority group reflects a mere-
exposure effect (i.e., a preference for stimuli that are presented more frequently; Zajonc, 1968).  
The current study 
The aim of the current study is to examine effects of illusory-correlation manipulations on 
implicit evaluation measures controlling for differences in mere exposure. We performed four 
high-powered pre-registered experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 provide conceptual replications of 
the study by Ratliff and Nosek (2010), additionally allowing independent tests of mere-exposure 
and illusory-correlation effects. Participants first read 36 statements about the valenced behaviors 
of two fictitious social groups (Niffites and Laapians), with twice the number of statements for 
one group (majority) compared to the other group (minority). Different from Ratliff and Nosek, 
we manipulated between subjects whether positive or negative behavioral statements were more 
frequent overall. In this design, a general preference for the majority group would reflect a mere-
exposure effect, but not an illusory-correlation effect. The latter would be reflected in a 
preference for the majority group when positive statements are more frequent overall, and a 
-                                                 
1 Note that Ratliff and Nosek’s (2010) study included two different types of control condition, one in which there 
was a higher ratio of positive to negative statements about the minority group and one in which there was a higher 
ratio of positive to negative statements about the majority group (but the statements were predominantly positive). 
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preference for the minority group when negative statements are more frequent overall (see 
Hamilton & Gifford, 1976).  
Because (in)sensitivity of the IAT to illusory correlation effects could reflect non-
evaluative processes, Experiments 3 and 4 aimed to replicate the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 
with two other measures of implicit evaluation: The Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP, 
Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) and the Evaluative Priming Task (EPT, Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). In the IAT, participants perform two binary 
categorizations (e.g., the categorization of valenced words as positive or negative and the 
categorization of the evaluation stimuli on the basis of their identity) and evaluation is inferred on 
the basis of differential performance when categorizations are performed using the same versus a 
different response key. This feature makes the IAT sensitive to factors unrelated to evaluation, 
such as asymmetries in the salience of stimuli (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004) or extra-personal 
knowledge (Olson & Fazio, 2004), calling for replications with measures that do not suffer from 
this limitation. 
The AMP and the EPT are widely used measures in which evaluative responding is also 
thought to occur under suboptimal conditions, that is under some of the conditions of 
automaticity (e.g., evaluative responding when there is little time to process stimuli or little 
opportunity or motivation to control responding; see De Houwer et al., 2009). In contrast to the 
IAT, however, evaluation is inferred on the basis of the effect of primes that precede the 
presentation of the target stimuli (i.e., valenced words or Chinese ideographs) on evaluation of 
these target stimuli. Furthermore, AMP scores are calculated on the basis of the number of 
positive and negative categorization responses rather than response latencies. These procedural 
differences might prevent the observation of variance in implicit evaluation scores that is due to 
non-evaluative processes. Moreover, by including measures other than the IAT, we can verify 
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whether the obtained results are specific to this one measure or whether they generalize to other 
measures that capture evaluative responding under suboptimal conditions. 
Experiments 1 and 2 
Method 
Participants. A total of 3557 (Experiment 1) and 3825 (Experiment 2) English-speaking 
volunteers were recruited to participate online via the Project Implicit research website 
(https://implicit.harvard.edu). There were 289 (8.1%) and 450 participants (11.8%) who decided 
not to complete the experiment after receiving information about the duration and the nature of 
the study. A total of 1343 (37.8%) and 1569 participants (41.0%) dropped out during the 
experiment, leaving 1925 participants in Experiment 1 and 1806 participants in Experiment 2. 
The dropout rates were comparable across the experimental conditions, χ2(3)s < 2.25, ps > .52. 
Hence, there was no evidence for condition-dependent attrition. A target sample size of 1800 
completed contributions was determined based on an a priori power analysis such that we would 
have sufficient power (i.e., power > 0.95) to detect a small between-subjects effect (d = 0.20) 
with an alpha criterion p < .05 in a two-tailed between-subjects t-test. Prior to data-collection, the 
target sample size was pre-registered together with the study design and data-analytic plans. 
Experiment 1 did not follow our planned study design, in that the order of the IAT and the self-
report rating task was not counterbalanced due to a programming error. We therefore performed a 
second experiment that did fully implement our intended design plan. The preregistered plans, 
raw data, experimental and analytic scripts of these and all other experiments are available at 
https://osf.io/ry9v3/?view_only=e6e26932b7bc47b98e99bd03603efb65. 
Following our preregistered data analysis plan, we excluded the data from participants 
who (a) did not fully complete all questions and tasks (Experiment 1: 90 participants; 4.9%; 
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Experiment 2: 76 participants; 4.2%), (b) had error rates above 30% when considering all IAT 
blocks or above 40% for any one of the critical IAT test blocks (Experiment 1: 285 participants; 
14.8%; Experiment 2: 288 participants; 15.9%), or (c) responded faster than 400ms on more than 
10% of the IAT trials (Experiment 1: 15 participants; 0.8%; Experiment 2: 10 participants; 
0.6%).  
Analyses were performed on the data of 1535 participants in Experiment 1 (950 women, 
mean age = 35, SD = 14) and 1432 participants in Experiment 2 (934 women, mean age = 35, SD 
= 15). Table 1 provides an overview of the number of participants in the different between-
subject conditions.  
Materials and Procedure. Participants first provided informed consent. In line with 
recommendations by Zhou and Fishbach (2016) to prevent selective attrition, participants were 
first (1) informed about the duration of the experiment and (2) asked to their best to complete all 
tasks in a thoughtful manner to help facilitate scientific advance.  
Impression formation task. Participants were given the following instructions:  
The purpose of this experiment is to find out how people process and retain information 
visually. The information you will read in the next part of the study consists of behaviors 
performed by members of two social groups - NIFFIANS and LAAPIANS. The groups 
described here are real groups that exist in society, but we are calling them NIFFIANS 
and LAAPIANS. When you are reading, try to form an impression of the two groups. Try 
to remember as much as you can because you will be asked about it later, but do not be 
discouraged if this seems difficult. Just do your best. Each sentence will appear on the 
screen for several seconds before automatically moving onto the next. Press the 
SPACEBAR when you are ready to begin. 
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During the impression formation task, positive and negative statements about four 
Niffians and four Laapians were presented in random order. An example of a negative statement 
about a Niffian is ‘Ibonnif, a Niffian, did not offer his guests anything to drink”. An example of a 
positive statement about a Laapian is ‘Zinaalap, a Laapian, sent his mother flowers for Mother’s 
Day”. The positive and negative behavioral statements were the same as in Ratliff and Nosek 
(2010, Experiment 2). Because our design included more negative statements than Ratliff and 
Nosek used, 8 negative items were taken from other research on attitude formation and change 
(Rydell & Gawronski, 2009).  
Each statement was presented for four seconds with an inter-trial interval of 1 second. In 
total, there were 24 statements about the majority group (6 about each group member) and 12 
statements about the minority group (3 about each group member). For half the participants, 16 
majority group statements were positive and 8 were negative whereas 8 minority group 
statements were positive and 4 were negative (Positive frequent condition). For the other 
participants, 16 majority group statements were negative and 8 were positive whereas 8 minority 
group statements were negative and 4 were positive (Negative frequent condition). It was 
counterbalanced between participants whether Niffians or Laapians were the majority group.  
IAT. During the IAT, participants categorized eight attribute words (i.e., antisocial, social, 
irresponsible, responsible, unlikeable, likeable, unpleasant, pleasant, unfriendly; friendly, 
popular, unpopular) as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ and the names of the four Niffians and Laapians as 
‘Niffians’ or ‘Laapians’. Participants began the IAT with 20 practice trials sorting the Niffians 
and Laapians names and 20 practice trials sorting the positive and negative words with left and 
right key presses (keys E and I). Next, participants completed one block of 20 and one block of 
40 trials in which Niffians and positive stimuli shared one response key and Laapians and 
negative stimuli shared another response key (or vice versa). Participants then practiced sorting 
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Niffians and Laapians on 40 trials with a reversed response key assignment. Finally, participants 
completed one block of 20 and one block of 40 trials in which Niffians shared a response key 
with negative and Lappians shared a response key with positive (or vice versa). If participants 
made an error in the categorization task, a red “X” appeared on the screen until participants 
provided the correct response. Latencies were recorded until a correct response was made. 
IAT scores were calculated using the D2-algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), 
such that higher scores indicate a stronger preference for Niffians over Laapians. The Spearman-
Brown corrected split-half reliability of the IAT score, calculated on the basis of an odd-even 
split, was r(1533) = .78 in Experiment 1 and r(1430) = .77 in Experiment 2. Across groups, 
participants displayed a preference for Laapians over Niffians (Experiment 1: M = -0.11, SD = 
0.42, t[1534] = -9.96, p < .001, d = 0.25; Experiment 2: M = -0.11, SD = 0.43, t[1431] = -9.58, p 
< .001, d = 0.25).  
Trait rating task. Explicit evaluations were measured with eight-point semantic 
differential ratings of both Niffians and Laapians on six traits each. The rated traits were identical 
to the attribute words in the IAT: antisocial-social, irresponsible-responsible, unlikeable- likeable, 
unpleasant-pleasant, unfriendly-friendly, and popular- unpopular. The order of IAT and trait 
rating task was counterbalanced across participants in Experiment 2 but not Experiment 1. 
We computed separate trait rating scores for Niffians and Laapians by averaging 
responses on the trait rating questions for each of the groups. An explicit evaluation score was 
computed by subtracting the resulting trait rating score for Laapians from the score for Niffians 
such that a positive value indicates a relative preference for Niffians over Laapians. Internal 
consistency of the self-reported evaluation score was high (Experiment 1: Cronbach’s Alpha = 
.87; Experiment 2: Cronbach’s Alpha = .79), and this score correlated significantly with the IAT 
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score (Experiment 1: r[1533] = .23, p < .001; Experiment 2: r[1430] = .19, p < .001). Across 
groups, participants displayed a small but robust preference for Laapians over Niffians 
(Experiment 1: M = -0.14, SD = 1.41, t[1534] = -3.97, p < .001, d = 0.10; Experiment 2: M = -
0.10, SD = 1.15, t[1431] = -3.17, p = .002, d = 0.08).  
Proportion test. Participants were informed about the number of statements they read 
about Niffians and Laapians at the beginning of the experiment and they were asked to indicate at 
the end how many of those they thought were positive for each group. Subsequently, participants 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
A proportion positive score was calculated by subtracting the proportion of statements 
that participants indicated were positive for Laapians from the proportion of statements that 
participants indicated were positive for Niffians. Overall, participants indicated a higher 
proportion of positive statements for Laapians than for Niffians but this was a small effect 
(Experiment 1: M = -2%, SD = 23%, t[1534] = 3.53, p < .001, d = 0.09; Experiment 2: M = -1%, 
SD = 22%, t[1431] = -2.00, p = .046, d = 0.05). This proportion positive score showed a small but 
significant correlation with IAT scores (Experiment 1: r[1533] = .08, p = .002; Experiment 2: 
r[1430] = .07, p = .011) and with self-reported evaluation scores (Experiment 1: r[1533] = .37, p 
< .001; Experiment 2: r[1430] = .34, p < .001). 
Results 
IAT scores.  
Experiment 1. We performed a 2 (Majority Group: Niffians, Laapians) x 2 (Valence 
Frequency: Positive frequent, Negative frequent) x 2 (IAT Order: Block with Niffians and 
positive together first/ Block with Laapians and positive together first) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on the IAT scores of Experiment 1.  
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The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Majority Group, F(1,1527) = 35.97, p < .001, 
indicating that IAT scores were higher when Niffians were the majority group (M = -0.04, SD = 
0.42) than when Laapians were the majority group (M = -0.17, SD = 0.41), d = 0.30. A Bayes 
factor (BF1) was calculated to evaluate how strongly the data support either the null or the 
alternative hypothesis (with BF1 < 0 reflecting stronger evidence for the absence of an effect and 
BF1 > 0 reflecting stronger evidence for the presence of an effect) with Cauchy prior width = 0.20 
(expected small effect). The Bayes factor indicates strong evidence for the presence of the main 
effect of Majority Group, BF1 > 1000. We also observed an effect of IAT Order, F(1,1527) = 
44.37, p < .001, indicating that IAT scores were higher when participants first categorized 
Laapians and positive together in the IAT (M = -0.04, SD = 0.42) than when they first categorized 
Niffians and positive together (M = -0.17, SD = 0.41), d = 0.34, BF1 > 1000. We did not observe 
the crucial interaction of Majority Group and Valence Frequency, F(1,1527) = 0.26, p = .61, BF1 
= 0.08 (Table 2), nor any other significant two-way interaction effects, Fs < 3.18, ps > .074, BF1s 
< 0.45. However, we did observe a significant but small three-way interaction effect, F(1,1527) = 
6.49, p = .011, BF1 = 3.13.  
For participants who first categorized Niffians and positive together in the IAT, we 
observed the interaction of Majority Group and Valence Frequency, F(1,750) = 4.61, p = .032, 
BF1 = 0.98, indicating that for the positive frequent group, IAT scores were higher when Niffians 
were the majority group (M = -0.09, SD = 0.42) than when Laapians were the majority group (M 
= -0.25, SD = 0.40), t(372) = 3.55, p < .001, 95% CIdiff = [0.07, 0.24], d = 0.37, BF1 = 53.33. We 
did not observe a Majority Group effect for the negative frequent group (Niffians Majority: M = -
0.17, SD = 0.40, Laapians Majority: M = -0.20, SD = 0.40), t(378) = 0.58, p = .56, 95% CIdiff = [-
0.06, 0.10], d = 0.06, BF1 = 0.39. For participants who first categorized Laapians and positive 
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together in the IAT, we did not observe a significant interaction effect of Majority Group and 
Valence Frequency, F(1,777) = 2.10, p = .15, BF1 = 0.30. 
Experiment 2. For Experiment 2, the ANOVA on IAT scores also included the factor 
Task Order (IAT first/self-report rating task first). We observed a main effect of Majority Group, 
F(1,1416) = 42.01, p < .001, indicating that IAT scores were higher when Niffians were the 
majority group (M = -0.04, SD = 0.43) than when Laapians were the majority group (M = -0.18, 
SD = 0.41), d = 0.34, BF1 > 1000. We also observed a small but significant main effect of IAT 
Order, F(1,1416) = 11.46, p < .001, indicating higher IAT scores when participants first 
categorized Laapians and positive together in the IAT (M = -0.07, SD = 0.43) than when they first 
categorized Niffians and positive together (M = -0.15, SD = 0.42), d = 0.17, BF1 = 19.61. We did 
not observe the crucial interaction of Majority Group and Valence Frequency, F(1,1416) = 1.13, 
p = .29, BF1 = 0.14, but we did observe a significant (but small) three-way interaction effect of 
Majority Group, Valence Frequency, and Task Order, F(1,1416) = 6.57, p = .010, BF1 = 3.65. For 
participants who first completed the IAT, we did not observe a significant interaction effect of 
Majority Group and Valence Frequency, F(1,729) = 1.13, p = .29, BF1 = 0.22. In contrast, we did 
observe a significant interaction of Majority Group and Valence Frequency for participants who 
first completed the self-report rating task, F(1,687) = 6.54, p = .011, BF1 = 3.26. For the positive 
frequent group, IAT scores were higher when Niffians were the majority group (M = -0.04, SD = 
0.41) than when Laapians were the majority group (M = -0.22, SD = 0.41), t(348) = 4.08, p < 
.001, 95% CIdiff = [0.09, 0.27], d = 0.44, BF1 = 288.30, whereas we did not observe a Majority 
Group effect for the negative frequent group (Niffians Majority: M = -0.09, SD = 0.42, Laapians 
Majority: M = -0.12, SD = 0.42), t(343) = 0.49, p = .63, 95% CIdiff = [-0.07, 0.11], d = 0.05, BF1 = 
0.39. The ANOVA did not reveal any other significant main or interaction effects, Fs < 3.03, ps > 
.082, BF1s < 0.12. 
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Self-reported evaluation scores.  
Experiment 1. The 2 (Majority Group) x 2 (Valence Frequency) x 2 (IAT Order) 
ANOVA on the self-reported evaluation scores of Experiment 1 did not show a main effect of 
Majority Group nor any other main or interaction effects, Fs < 2.60, ps > .10, BF1s < 0.20, with 
the exception of a significant interaction between Majority Group and Valence Frequency, 
F(1,1527) = 14.31, p < .001, BF1 = 97.44. For the positive frequent group, self-reported 
evaluation scores were higher when Niffians were the majority group (M = 0.02, SD = 1.38) than 
when Laapians were the majority group (M = -0.37, SD = 1.40), t(755) = 3.86, p < .001, 95% 
CIdiff = [0.19, 0.59], d = 0.28, BF1 = 170.54, but not for the negative frequent group (Niffians 
Majority: M = -0.19, SD = 1.38, Laapians Majority: M = -0.03, SD = 1.40), t(776) = -1.54, p = 
.12, 95% CIdiff = [-0.35, 0.04], d = 0.11, BF1 = 0.70. 
Experiment 2. The 2 (Majority Group) x 2 (Valence Frequency) x 2 (IAT Order) x 2 
(Task order) ANOVA on the self-reported evaluation scores of Experiment 2 revealed a small but 
significant main effect of IAT Order, F(1,1416) = 4.14, p = .042, indicating higher self-reported 
evaluation scores when participants first categorized Niffians and positive together in the IAT (M 
= -0.02, SD = 1.22) than when they first categorized Laapians and positive together (M = -0.16, 
SD = 1.08), d = 0.12, BF1 = 1.89. Crucially, we also observed the interaction between Majority 
Group and Valence Frequency, F(1,1416) = 13.51, p < .001, BF1 = 54.97. For the positive 
frequent group, self-reported evaluation scores were higher when Niffians were the majority 
group (M = 0.03, SD = 1.11) than when Laapians were the majority group (M = -0.19, SD = 
1.15), t(721) = 2.69, p = .007, 95% CIdiff = [0.06, 0.39], d = 0.20, BF1 = 11.50, whereas for the 
negative frequent group self-reported evaluation scores were lower when Niffians were the 
majority group (M = -0.21, SD = 1.17) than when Laapians were the majority group (M = 0.00, 
SD = 1.15), t(707) = -2.44, p = .015, 95% CIdiff = [-0.21, -0.01], d = 0.18, BF1 = 2.32. We also 
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observed a small interaction effect of Majority Group, Valence, and Task Order, F(1,1416) = 
6.03, p = .014, BF1 = 1.85, indicating that the interaction effect of Majority Group and Valence 
Frequency was significant for participants who first completed the self-report rating task, 
F(1,687) = 21.41, p < .001, BF1 > 1000, but not for participants who first completed the IAT, 
F(1,729) = 0.67, p = .41, BF1 = 0.16. The ANOVA did not reveal any other significant effects, Fs 
< 3.70, ps > .054, BF1s < 0.11. 
Combined analyses of IAT and self-reported evaluation scores. 
Experiment 1. To directly compare effects on IAT and self-reported evaluation scores, we 
performed an ANOVA on standardized scores that included Majority Group, Valence Frequency, 
and IAT Order as between-subject factors and Measure (IAT, self-reported evaluation score) as 
within-subjects factor. We observed a main effect of IAT Order, F(1, 1526) = 22.55, p < .001, 
BF1 > 1000, which was qualified by an interaction of IAT Order and Measure, F(1, 1526) = 
21.26, p < .001, BF1 > 1000. More importantly, we also observed a main effect of Majority 
Group, F(1, 1526) = 23.29, p < .001, BF1 > 1000, an interaction of Majority Group and Valence 
Frequency, F(1, 1526) = 7.64, p = .006, BF1 = 7.50, a three-way interaction of Majority Group, 
Valence Frequency, and Measure, F(1, 1526) = 7.13, p = .008, BF1 = 8.09, and a four-way 
interaction of Majority Group, Valence Frequency, Measure, and IAT Order, F(1, 1526) = 7.52, p 
= .006, BF1 = 4.12. The latter interaction revealed that the Majority Group x Valence Frequency x 
Measure interaction was present for participants who first categorized Laapians and positive 
together in the IAT, F(1, 777) = 14.80, p < .001, BF1 = 983.10, but not for participants who first 
categorized Niffians and positive together in the IAT, F(1, 750) = 0.00, p = .96, BF1 < 0.01. 
Experiment 2. The Majority Group x Valence Frequency x IAT Order x Task Order x 
Measure ANOVA revealed an interaction of IAT Order and Measure, F(1, 1416) = 18.11, p < 
ILLUSORY-CORRELATION EFFECTS                 19 
.001, BF1 > 1000. More importantly, we also observed a main effect of Majority Group, F(1, 
1416) = 17.59, p < .001, BF1 > 1000, an interaction of Majority Group and Valence Frequency, 
F(1, 1526) = 9.49, p = .002, BF1 = 5.11, an interaction of Majority Group and Measure, F(1, 
1526) = 25.41, p < .001, BF1 > 1000, a three-way interaction of Majority Group, Valence 
Frequency, and Task Order, F(1, 1526) = 10.56, p = .001, BF1 = 9.21, and of Majority Group, 
Valence Frequency, and Measure, F(1, 1526) = 4.31, p = .040, BF1 = 1.59, and finally, a five-way 
interaction of Majority Group, Valence Frequency, Measure, Task Order, and IAT Order, F(1, 
1526) = 5.62, p = .020, BF1 = 2.19. The latter interaction revealed that the crucial Majority Group 
x Valence Frequency x Measure interaction was present for (1) participants who first categorized 
Laapians and positive together in the IAT and who started with the IAT, F(1, 381) = 4.91, p = 
.030, BF1 = 2.98, and (2) participants who first categorized Niffians and positive together in the 
IAT and who started with the trait rating task, F(1, 325) = 4.67, p = .032, BF1 = 3.06, but not for 
participants who first categorized Niffians and positive together in the IAT and who started with 
the IAT, F(1, 348) = 0.00, p = .96, BF1 < 0.01, or for participants who first categorized Laapians 
and positive together in the IAT and who started with the trait rating task, F(1, 362) = 0.07, p = 
.79, BF1 = 0.02. 
Proportion positive scores.  
Experiment 1. A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA in Experiment 1 revealed a main effect of Majority 
Group, F(1, 1527) = 165.33, p < .001, indicating that participants reported a lower proportion of 
positive statements for Niffians when Niffians were the majority group (M = -9%, SD = 22%) 
than when Laapians were the majority group (M = 5%, SD = 22%), d = 0.66, BF1 >1000. We also 
observed an interaction of Majority Group and Valence Frequency, F(1, 1527) = 15.83, p < .001, 
BF1 >1000, indicating that the main effect of Majority Group was reduced when the majority of 
the statements were positive, t(755) = -6.04, p < .001, 95% CIdiff = [-0.13, -0.07], d = 0.44, BF1 > 
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1000, compared to when the majority of the statements were negative, t(776) = -12.41, p <.001, 
95% CIdiff = [-0.22, -0.16], d = 0.89, BF1 > 1000. 
Experiment 2. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA in Experiment 2 also revealed a main effect of 
Majority Group, F(1, 1416) = 108.67, p < .001, indicating that participants reported a lower 
proportion of positive statements for Niffians when Niffians were the majority group (M = -7%, 
SD = 21%) than when Laapians were the majority group (M = 5%, SD = 21%), d = 0.55, BF1 > 
1000. We also observed an interaction of Majority Group and Valence Frequency, F(1, 1416) = 
37.91, p < .001, BF1 > 1000, indicating that the main effect of Majority Group was reduced when 
the majority of the statements were positive, t(721) = -3.72, p < .001, 95% CIdiff = [-0.09, -0.03], 
d = 0.28, BF1 = 104.69, compared to when the majority of the statements were negative, t(707) = 
-10.83, p <.001, 95% CIdiff = [-0.21, -0.14], d = 0.81, BF1 > 1000. We also observed an 
interaction of Valence, IAT Order, and Task Order, F(1, 1416) = 5.43, p = .020, BF1 = 1.35. 
Discussion 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed the expected illusory-correlation effect on explicit 
evaluations: participants preferred the group for which they learned more information (the 
majority group) when the majority of the statements were positive but not when the majority of 
the statements were negative. Importantly, this illusory-correlation effect was not observed on 
IAT scores which only revealed a general preference for the group participants learned more 
information about, irrespective of valence frequency (i.e., a mere-exposure effect). Unexpectedly, 
we also did not observe a typical illusory-correlation effect on estimated proportions of positive 
information. There was a difference in proportion estimates depending on the valence of the 
majority of statements, but both groups reported a lower proportion of positive statements for the 
majority group. One possible explanation is that the proportion measure asked participants to 
indicate the total number of pieces of positive information about each group. However, the total 
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number of pieces of information was different for both groups and, though the instructions 
emphasized this difference, some participants might not have taken this into account when 
providing their answers. 
Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 failed to provide support for illusory-correlation effects on implicit 
evaluations. It is possible, however, that specific characteristics of the implicit evaluation 
measure (i.e., the IAT) preclude observation of such an effect. In Experiments 3 and 4, we 
therefore extend our investigation to two other popular measures of implicit evaluation. The 
design of Experiment 3 was similar to that of Experiments 1 and 2, with two exceptions. First, the 
implicit evaluation measure consisted of an Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP: Payne et al., 
2005). In this task, participants evaluate Chinese ideographs that are preceded by brief 
presentations of a prime (i.e., the name of Niffians or Laapians) that participants are instructed to 
ignore. Implicit evaluation scores were computed based on the difference in the proportion of 
positive responses in the context of the different types of primes. Second, we used a different 
measure for the estimated proportion of positive information in which participants used a slider to 
indicate the percentage of positive to negative pieces of information for both groups. 
Method 
Participants. A total of 3334 English-speaking volunteers were recruited to participate 
online via the Project Implicit research website (https://implicit.harvard.edu). There were 307 
(9.2%) participants who decided not to complete the experiment after receiving information about 
the duration and the nature of the study. A total of 1198 (35.9%) participants dropped out during 
the experiment, leaving 1829 participants. The dropout rates were not significantly different 
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across the experimental conditions, χ2(3)s < 5.10, ps > .18. Hence, there was no evidence for 
condition-dependent attrition. Sampling plan was the same as for Experiments 1 and 2. 
Data were excluded for participants who (a) did not fully complete all questions and tasks 
(134 participants; 7.3%), or (b) showed the same response on all trials in the AMP blocks (300 
participants; 14.8%). Analyses were performed on the data of 1395 participants (846 women, 
mean age = 32, SD = 14). Table 3 provides an overview of the number of participants in the 
different between-subject conditions.  
Procedure. Procedure was identical to Experiments 1 and 2, with three exceptions. First, 
behavioral statements were now presented for 5000ms. This change was made because some 
participants in Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that they were unable to read the entire statement 
for all statements and we wanted to ensure this. 
Second, participants completed an AMP instead of an IAT. The AMP procedure followed 
Cone and Ferguson (2015) and consisted of one practice block consisting of three trials that used 
the word table or chair as primes and three critical blocks of 40 trials that included the names of 
the Niffians and Laapians as primes. On each trial, participants were presented with a prime 
stimulus for 75ms, a blank screen for 125ms, and a Chinese ideograph for 100ms, which was 
then covered with a black-and-white pattern mask. Participants were asked to indicate if they 
considered the Chinese ideograph more or less visually pleasant than average by pressing either 
“E” or “I”, respectively.  
AMP scores were calculated by subtracting the proportion of pleasant responses on trials 
with Laapian primes from the proportion of pleasant responses on trials with Niffian primes, such 
that higher scores indicate a stronger preference for Niffians over Laapians. The Spearman-
Brown corrected split-half reliability of the AMP score was low, r(1261) = .18. Across groups, 
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participants displayed a small preference for Laapians over Niffians (M = -0.01, SD = 0.10), 
t(1261) = -2.44, p = .015, d = 0.07. The AMP score showed a small but significant correlation 
with the self-reported evaluation scores (internal consistency: Cronbach’s Alpha = .78), r(1260) = 
.06, p = .028, which also revealed a small preference for Laapians over Niffians (M = -0.10, SD = 
1.24), t(1534) = -2.74, p = .006, d = 0.08. 
A third change to the procedure was in the proportion test. Participants were now asked to 
indicate the proportion (rather than the total number) of statements about Niffians and Laapians 
that they thought were positive. Responses were given on a slider scale ranging from 0% to 
100%. A proportion positive score was calculated by subtracting the proportion of statements that 
participants indicated were positive for Laapians from the proportion of statements that 
participants indicated were positive for Niffians. Overall, participants indicated a slightly higher 
proportion of positive statements for Laapians than for Niffians (M = -1%, SD = 20%), t(1261) = 
-2.00, p = .047, d = 0.06. This proportion positive score correlated significantly with AMP scores, 
r(1260) = .10, p < .001, and with self-reported evaluation scores, r(1260) = .64, p < .001. 
Results 
AMP scores. We performed a 2 (Majority Group) x 2 (Valence Frequency) x 2 (Task 
Order) ANOVA on AMP scores. The ANOVA revealed a small but significant main effect of 
Majority Group, F(1,1254) = 4.19, p = .041, indicating that AMP scores were lower when 
Niffians were the majority group (M = -0.01, SD = 0.10) than when Laapians were the majority 
group (M = 0.00, SD = 0.10), d = 0.11, BF1 = 1.24. We also observed a small effect of Valence 
Frequency, F(1,1254) = 6.95, p = .008, indicating that AMP scores were lower when the majority 
of information was positive (M = -0.01, SD = 0.10) than when the majority of information was 
negative (M = 0.00, SD = 0.09), d = 0.14, BF1 = 2.88. We did not observe the crucial interaction 
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of Majority Group and Valence Frequency, F(1,1254) = 0.72, p = .40, BF1 = 0.13 (Table 4), nor 
any other significant interaction effects, Fs < 1.69, ps > .19, BF1s < 0.23.  
Self-reported evaluation scores. The 2 (Majority Group) x 2 (Valence Frequency) x 2 
(Task Order) ANOVA on the self-reported evaluation scores did not show a main effect of 
Majority Group nor any other main or interaction effects, Fs < 2.79, ps > .095, BF1s < 0.54, with 
the exception of a significant interaction between Majority Group and Valence Frequency, 
F(1,1254) = 18.82, p < .001, BF1 = 398.56. For the positive frequent group, self-reported 
evaluation scores were higher when Niffians were the majority group (M = 0.04, SD = 1.22) than 
when Laapians were the majority group (M = -0.23, SD = 1.13), t(633) = 2.87, p = .004, 95% 
CIdiff = [0.08, 0.45], d = 0.23, BF1 = 8.92, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for the 
negative frequent group (Niffians Majority: M = -0.23, SD = 1.27, Laapians Majority: M = 0.08, 
SD = 1.30), t(625) = -3.01, p = .003, 95% CIdiff = [-0.51, -0.11], d = 0.24, BF1 = 12.76. 
Combined analyses of AMP and self-reported evaluation scores. The ANOVA on 
standardized AMP and self-reported evaluation scores revealed a main effect of Valence 
Frequency, F(1, 1253) = 4.07, p = .043, BF1 = 1.18, which was qualified by an interaction of 
Majority Group and Valence Frequency, F(1, 1253) = 12.60, p < .001, BF1 = 89.12, and a three-
way interaction of Majority Group, Valence Frequency, and Measure, F(1, 1253) = 6.43, p = 
.011, BF1 = 8.57.  
Proportion positive scores. A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a main effect of Majority 
Group, F(1, 1254) = 13.87, p < .001, indicating that participants reported a lower proportion of 
positive statements for Niffians when Niffians were the majority group (M = -3%, SD = 20%) 
than when Laapians were the majority group (M = 1%, SD = 22%), d = 0.21, BF1 = 140.64. 
Crucially, we also observed an interaction of Majority Group and Valence Frequency , F(1, 1527) 
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= 15.83, p < .001, indicating that the main effect of Majority Group was observed when the 
majority of the statements were negative, t(625) = -5.07, p < .001, 95% CIdiff = [-11.68, -5.16], d 
= 0.41, BF1 > 1000, but not when they were positive, t(633) = -0.21, p =.83, 95% CIdiff = [-3.33, 
2.68], d = 0.02, BF1 = 0.29. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 showed illusory-correlation effects on self-reported evaluation scores and 
on proportion estimates. Importantly, however, implicit evaluation scores as obtained with the 
AMP did not reveal illusory-correlation effects, in line with the results for IAT scores in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 included another common measure of implicit evaluation: the Evaluative 
Priming Task (EPT: Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). In this task, participants 
evaluate positive and negative words that are preceded by the presentation of a prime that 
participants are instructed to ignore. For the sake of consistency with the self-report task, the 
prime consisted of the social group category names (the word Niffian or Laapian: see also Van 
Dessel et al., 2015). Implicit evaluation scores were computed based on differences in reaction 
times for positive and negative responses in the context of the different types of primes. 
Method 
Participants. A total of 3675 English-speaking volunteers were recruited to participate 
online via the Project Implicit research website (https://implicit.harvard.edu). A total of 369 
(10.0%) participants decided not to complete the experiment after receiving information about the 
duration and the nature of the study and 1415 participants (38.50%) dropped out during the 
experiment, leaving 1829 participants. The dropout rates were not significantly different across 
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the experimental conditions, χ2(3)s < 4.20 , ps > .24. Hence, there was no evidence for condition-
dependent attrition. Sampling plan was the same as for Experiments 1-3.  
Data were excluded for participants who (a) did not fully complete all questions and tasks 
(314 participants; 16.6%), or (b) had an excessive number of errors (>60%) in the EPT or did not 
have any trials left in each of the trial conditions following outlier treatment (20 participants; 
1.1%). Analyses were performed on the data of 1551 participants (978 women, mean age = 38, 
SD = 15) (Table 3).  
Procedure. Procedure was identical to Experiment 3 with the exception that an EPT was 
completed instead of an AMP. The EPT procedure followed Hu, Gawronski, and Balas (2017) 
and comprised 3 blocks of 40 test trials. A single trial consisted of the presentation of a fixation 
cross for 500 ms, a prime for 200 ms, and the presentation of a target word for a maximum of 
1500 ms. Targets consisted of 10 positive words (e.g., the words pleasant and good) and 10 
negative words (e.g., the words unpleasant and bad). The prime stimuli were the group names 
(Niffians and Laapians) (in line with the targets used in the self-report rating task).  
Latencies from trials with errors (4.5% of trials) and trials with latencies lower than 
300ms (0.4% of trials) or higher than 1000ms (18.6% of trials) were removed (Koppehele-
Gossel, Hoffmann, Banse, & Gawronski, 2020). A score was calculated for each social group by 
subtracting the mean response latency to positive target words preceded by primes related to the 
social group from the mean response latency to negative target words preceded by the same 
prime. Scores for Laapians were subtracted from scores for Niffians such that higher values 
indicate more favorable implicit evaluations of Niffians over Luupians. The split-half reliability 
of the EPT score was poor, r(1869) = -.06. Across groups, participants displayed a small 
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preference for Laapians over Niffians (M = -3.07, SD = 44.93), t(1261) = -2.69, p = .007, d = 
0.07.  
The EPT scores correlated significantly with the self-reported evaluation scores (internal 
consistency: Cronbach’s Alpha = .79), r(1549) = .05, p = .056, which also revealed a small 
preference for Laapians over Niffians (M = -0.08, SD = 1.19), t(1534) = -2.58, p = .010, d = 0.07. 
The EPT scores also correlated significantly with proportion positive scores, r(1549) = .05, p = 
.035, which indicated a slightly higher proportion of positive statements for Laapians than for 
Niffians overall (M = -2%, SD = 19%), t(1550) = -3.18, p = .001, d = 0.08.  
Results 
EPT scores. We performed a 2 (Majority Group) x 2 (Valence Frequency) x 2 (Task 
Order) ANOVA on EPT scores. The ANOVA did not show main effects of Majority Group, 
F(1,1542) = 0.10, p = .75, BF1 = 0.20, or of Valence Frequency, F(1,1542) = 0.08, p = .77, BF1 = 
0.20. We also did not observe the crucial interaction of Majority Group and Valence Frequency, 
F(1,1542) = 0.86, p = .36, BF1 = 0.12, (Table 4), nor any other significant effects, Fs < 0.60, ps > 
.43, BF1s < 0.13.  
Self-reported evaluation scores. The 2 (Majority Group) x 2 (Valence Frequency) x 2 
(Task order) ANOVA on the self-reported evaluation scores revealed a small main effect of 
Majority Group, F(1,1542) = 6.97, p = .008, indicating that self-reported evaluation scores were 
higher when Niffians were the majority group (M = 0.00, SD = 1.18) than when Laapians were 
the majority group (M = -0.17, SD = 1.19), d = 0.14, BF1 = 7.21. We also observed a significant 
interaction between Majority Group and Valence Frequency, F(1,1542) = 19.09, p < .001, BF1 = 
925.52. For the positive frequent group, self-reported evaluation scores were higher when 
Niffians were the majority group (M = 0.14, SD = 1.23) than when Laapians were the majority 
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group (M = -0.27, SD = 1.33), t(830) = 4.65, p < .001, 95% CIdiff = [0.24, 0.58], d = 0.33, BF1 > 
1000, whereas there was no significant difference for the negative frequent group (Niffians 
Majority: M = -0.13, SD = 1.11, Laapians Majority: M = -0.03, SD = 1.01), t(717) = -1.32, p = 
.19, 95% CIdiff = [-0.26, 0.05], d = 0.10, BF1 = 0.55. There was also an interaction of Valence 
Frequency x Task Order, F(1,1542) = 4.25, p = .039, BF1 = 0.62, but no other significant effects, 
Fs < 3.61, ps > .057, BF1s < 0.55. 
Combined analyses of EPT and self-reported evaluation scores. The ANOVA on 
standardized EPT and self-reported evaluation scores revealed an interaction of Majority Group 
and Task, F(1, 1542) = 4.55, p = .030, BF1 = 1.32, an interaction of Majority Group and Valence 
Frequency, F(1, 1542) = 13.31, p < .001, BF1 > 1000, and a three-way interaction of Majority 
Group, Valence Frequency, and Measure, F(1, 1542) = 6.12, p = .010, BF1 = 3.62.  
Proportion positive scores. The 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed a small main effect of 
Majority Group, F(1, 1542) = 8.78, p = .003, indicating that participants reported a lower 
proportion of positive statements for Niffians when Niffians were the majority group (M = -3%, 
SD = 20%) than when Laapians were the majority group (M = 0%, SD = 19%), d = 0.12, BF1 = 
2.08. Crucially, we also observed an interaction of Majority Group and Valence Frequency , F(1, 
1542) = 24.14, p < .001, BF1 > 1000, indicating that the main effect of Majority Group was 
observed when the majority of the statements were negative, t(717) = -5.18, p < .001, 95% CIdiff 
= [-10.03, -4.51], d = 0.39, BF1 > 1000, but not when they were positive, t(830) = 1.57, p =.12, 
95% CIdiff = [-0.53, 4.74], d = 0.11, BF1 = 0.72. 
Discussion 
Similar to Experiment 3, Experiment 4 revealed illusory-correlation effects on self-
reported evaluation scores and on proportion estimates but not on implicit evaluation scores (as 
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probed with an EPT). Notably, the internal consistency of the EPT (and of the AMP in 
Experiment 3) was very low which could represent a limitation of the study. Low reliabilities, 
however, are not uncommon for EPT and AMP scores (Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014; Van 
Dessel et al., 2017). Moreover, effects of experimental manipulations can be robustly established 
even with measures that show suboptimal performance in picking up differences between 
individuals (De Schryver, Hughes, Rosseel, & De Houwer, 2015), which is reflected in the fact 
that AMP, EPT, and self-reported measures revealed a preference for Laapians over Niffians. 
General Discussion 
Four experiments investigated illusory-correlation effects on implicit and explicit 
evaluations. Participants first read valenced statements about two fictitious social groups, with 
more total statements about one group (majority) than about another group (minority). Even 
though the proportion of positive to negative statements was the same for both groups, 
participants reported a preference for the majority group when there were more positive 
statements overall, and a preference for the minority group when there were more negative 
statements. Importantly, implicit evaluations did not reflect this illusory correlation effect. 
Instead, participants exhibited an overall preference for the majority group on the IAT (i.e., a 
mere-exposure effect), and no preference for either group on the EPT and AMP.  
The current results replicate and extend earlier findings by Ratliff and Nosek (2010), 
indicating that illusory-correlation effects do not emerge for implicit evaluations. Importantly, 
this result does not appear to be limited to the IAT and it is not the result of confounds in the 
original study design. Our results also partially replicate findings by Carraro et al. (2014), 
showing an effect on IAT scores in an illusory-correlation paradigm, but our modified design 
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suggests that this effect likely reflects a mere-exposure effect rather than an illusory-correlation 
effect.  
Theoretical implications 
The fact that illusory-correlation effects did not emerge for implicit evaluations provides 
support for guessing-based explanations for the illusory-correlation effect. From this perspective, 
illusory-correlation effects depend on processes operating during measurement (belief 
expression) rather than processes operating during learning (belief formation). We speculate that, 
when participants read the behavioral statements, they do not derive or encode differences in the 
proportion of valenced statements between the groups. Only when they are asked to self-report 
their preferences, or to estimate the proportions of valenced information, do they try to 
distinguish between the two groups, essentially guessing about differences in proportions and 
resulting evaluations. In this guessing process, they then can make a mistake, judging that 
positive but not negative behavioral statements had more often been assigned to the majority 
group (Bulli & Primi, 2006). When evaluation occurs under some of the conditions of 
automaticity (e.g., there is little time or little effort to control evaluative responses to the stimuli), 
participants do not readily engage in this guessing process and illusory-correlation effects might 
not show up.  
It is important to note that Experiment 1 did find a small effect of Majority Group and 
Valence Frequency on IAT scores in one IAT order condition. However, the Bayes Factor 
indicates no evidence for this interaction effect (BF1 = 0.98) and Experiment 2 did not replicate 
this effect. Notably, Experiment 2 provided stronger evidence (BF1 = 3.26) for an interaction 
effect of Majority Group, Valence Frequency, and Task Order on IAT scores. This might indicate 
that IAT scores could reveal small illusory-correlation effects. This effect, however, can be easily 
accommodated by guessing accounts: Completing self-report measures (which invoke guessing) 
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before completing the IAT might lead to illusory-correlation beliefs that can influence IAT 
performance. From this perspective, illusory-correlation effects can be observed irrespective of 
the measure once participants have engaged in guessing processes. However, this post-hoc 
explanation should be treated with caution, because the interaction effect was weak, and it was 
not observed in Experiments 3 and 4.  
It is further noteworthy that explicit evaluations and proportion estimates did not always 
accord with one another. Experiments 1 and 2 provided evidence for illusory-correlation effects 
on explicit evaluations but not proportion estimates. Though this could be due to issues related to 
participants not being able to adequately report their actual proportion estimates, it might also 
reflect a true dissociative pattern. Indeed, Experiments 3 and 4 (and a meta-analysis of these 
results) also showed evidence for a dissociation in proportion estimates and explicit evaluations. 
Specifically, the effect on proportion estimates was observed only when the majority of 
information was negative (in contrast with Hamilton & Gifford, 1976, and Ratliff & Nosek, 
2010) whereas explicit evaluations showed an effect also when positive information was more 
frequent. These results further support the important role of measurement-related processes in 
illusory-correlation effects. At first glance, however, these effects might seem inconsistent with 
guessing-based theories given that proportion judgment measures require estimation of 
information and are therefore likely to invoke guessing the source of positive and negative 
behavioral statements. One explanation is that participants try to distinguish between groups on 
the basis of the received information (by engaging in effortful guessing-related processes) only 
when they are urged to evaluate the groups because differential evaluation is considered more 
important or because people are more accustomed to doing this (Berndsen & Spears, 1997).  
The current results do not fit well with illusory-correlation theories that attribute effects to 
processes during learning (belief formation). These theories assume that differences in beliefs 
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about the (relative) number of positive and negative statements for the two groups are learned 
during encoding (e.g., due to differences in information salience: Hamilton & Gifford, 1976, or 
differences in the number of learning trials: Fiedler, 1991). These beliefs should influence 
different measures of evaluative behavior to a similar extent (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976) which 
contrasts with the evidence for illusory-correlation effects on explicit evaluations but not on 
implicit evaluations (or proportion estimates). These theories could accommodate our results if 
they assume that the key processes explaining effects occur (also) during retrieval. The 
distinctiveness account could explain effects in terms of enhanced availability in memory of 
distinctive information during retrieval (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). It is possible that salience 
of the doubly infrequent events affects judgments only when participants retrieve the information 
(under non-automatic conditions). Fiedler’s information loss account (1991) already distinguishes 
a separate judgment formation stage; however, it is argued that this occurs on-line (during the 
pairings). A revised account could potentially designate this process to the measurement phase.  
Another explanation to consider is that implicit measures such as the IAT, AMP, and EPT 
measure evaluation in a more noisy manner than self-report measures (Blanton & Jaccard, 2015) 
and are therefore less sensitive to (subtle) effects like illusory-correlation effects. While this 
explanation cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely to provide a full explanation of our results 
given that (1) illusory-correlation effects on self-report measures revealed illusory-correlation 
effects with moderate effect sizes (mean difference in effect size d = 0.41), (2) our experiments 
had ample statistical power for observing small effects, and (3) implicit measures revealed other 
evaluative effects (e.g., a preference for the majority over the minority group; a preference for 
Laapians over Niffians).  
Implications for stereotype research and future directions 
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The current results are relevant for stereotype formation research. If illusory correlations 
impact stereotype formation and related behavior, then our results suggest that this strongly 
depends on processes during belief expression. For example, people might be more likely to 
erroneously designate more positive behaviors to (in-group) majorities than to (out-group) 
minorities when they are motivated or have ample opportunity to distinguish between groups. 
This might imply a strong relation between illusory-correlation effects (and stereotype formation) 
with certain (motivational) personality traits such as generalized prejudice (Bergh & Akrami, 
2017) and with certain social environments (e.g., whether a person’s social environment reacts 
positively or negatively to group distinction) (Sears & Patrick, 2003).  
In line with previous research, the current study examined illusory correlation effects on 
evaluations of unfamiliar social groups (i.e., Niffians and Laapians). Thus, it is possible that the 
obtained asymmetry reflects low sensitivity of implicit evaluation measures to novel information 
that has not been highly overlearned. In line with this idea, it has been argued that implicit 
evaluation measures reflect deeply-ingrained, longstanding associations that have been 
established by years of reinforcement (e.g., Rudman, 2004), which would explain why we found 
illusory correlation effects based on novel information on explicit, but not implicit, evaluations. 
However, counter to this interpretation, the available evidence suggests that implicit evaluation 
measures are highly sensitive to novel information that has not been highly overlearned (for a 
review, see Gawronski & Sritharan, 2010). Based on this evidence, differential sensitivity to 
novel information seems unlikely to account for the obtained pattern of results. Nonetheless, it is 
possible that our results might not generalize to other groups for other reasons. For instance, 
implicit evaluation measures might be more sensitive to factors unrelated to evaluation for 
unfamiliar social groups, precluding observation of illusory correlation effects. Future studies 
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might test this idea by examining illusory correlation effects on implicit evaluations of well-
known social groups (e.g., racial in- and out-groups). 
Our study also did not test which specific conditions (of non-automaticity) are required 
for the illusory-correlation effect to arise. We used implicit evaluation measures for which 
evaluative responding is thought to occur under several conditions of automaticity and we 
therefore do not know which automaticity features are important. For example, effects could 
depend on controllability, fastness, intentionality, or motivation. These questions might be tested 
in future studies that manipulate the automaticity conditions of evaluative responding (see Payne 
et al., 2008; Van Dessel et al., 2020, for examples of studies that used such manipulations). 
Future studies could also examine whether illusory-correlation effects require effortful 
processing. For instance, one could test if effects on implicit evaluation measures are observed 
when the application of illusory-correlation beliefs is automatized on the basis of extensive 
practice, whether this relates to real-life stereotypes or implicit prejudice as observed for well-
known racial groups (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013), and whether this bias can be re-trained. As 
such, the current study suggests new directions for research on attitude and stereotype formation. 
  
ILLUSORY-CORRELATION EFFECTS                 35 
References 
Banaji, M. R., & Greenwald, A. G. (2013). Blindspot: Hidden biases of good people. New York, 
NY: Random House. 
Bergh, R., & Akrami, N. (2017). Generalized prejudice: Old wisdom and new perspectives. In C. 
G. Sibley & F. K. Barlow (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of the psychology of 
prejudice (p. 438–460). Cambridge University Press. 
Blanton, H., & Jaccard, J. (2015). Not So Fast: Ten Challenges to Importing Implicit Attitude 
Measures to Media Psychology. Media Psychology, 18, 338-369. 
Carraro, L., Negri, P., Castelli, L., & Pastore, M. (2014). Implicit and explicit illusory correlation 
as a function of political ideology. PLoS ONE 9(5):e96312.  
Corneille, O., & Mertens, G. (in press). Behavioral and physiological evidence challenges the 
automatic acquisition of evaluations. Current Directions in Psychological Science. 
De Houwer, J. (2014). A propositional model of implicit evaluation. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 8, 342–353.  
De Houwer, J., Beckers, T., & Moors, A. (2007). Novel attitudes can be faked on the Implicit 
Association Test. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 972–978.  
De Houwer, J., Gawronski, B., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2013). A functional-cognitive framework 
for attitude research. European Review of Social Psychology, 24(1), 252–287. 
De Houwer, J., Teige-Mocigemba, S., Spruyt, A., & Moors, A. (2009). Implicit measures: A 
normative analysis and review. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 347-368. 
ILLUSORY-CORRELATION EFFECTS                 36 
De Houwer, J., Van Dessel, P., & Moran, T. (2020). Attitudes beyond associations: On the role 
of propositional representations in stimulus evaluation. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 61, 127-83.  
De Schryver, M., Hughes, S., Rosseel, Y., & De Houwer, J. (2015). Unreliable yet still 
replicable: A comment on LeBel and Paunonen (2011). Frontiers in Psychology. 6: 2039. 
Eder, A. B., Fiedler, K., Hamm-Eder, S. (2011). Illusory correlations revisited: The role of 
pseudo-contingencies and working-memory capacity. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 64, 517–532. 
Fazio, R. H., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Powell, M. C., & Kardes, F. R. (1986). On the automatic 
activation of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 229–238.  
Fiedler, K. (1991). The tricky nature of skewed frequency tables: An information loss account of 
distinctiveness-based illusory correlations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
60, 24–36 
Fiedler, K., & Walther, E. (2004). Stereotyping as inductive hypothesis testing. New York: 
Psychology Press. 
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in 
evaluation: an integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological 
Bulletin, 132, 692–731.  
Gawronski, B., & De Houwer, J. (2014). Implicit measures in social and personality psychology. 
In H. T. Reis, & C. M. Judd (Eds.), Handbook of research methods in social and 
personality psychology (2nd edition, pp. 283–310). New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
ILLUSORY-CORRELATION EFFECTS                 37 
Gawronski, B., De Houwer, J., & Sherman. J. W. (in press). Twenty-five years of research using 
implicit measures. Social Cognition. 
Gawronski, B., & Sritharan, R. (2010). Formation, change, and contextualization of mental 
associations: Determinants and principles of variations in implicit measures. In B. 
Gawronski, & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of implicit social cognition: Measurement, 
theory, and applications (pp. 216-240). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Geraerts, E., Bernstein, D.M., Merckelbach, H., Linders, C., Raymaekers, L., & Loftus, E.F.. 
(2008). Lasting false beliefs and their behavioral consequences. Psychological Science, 
19, 749–753. 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. (1998). Measuring individual differences in 
implicit cognition: the implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74, 1464–1480. 
Hamilton, D. L., & Gifford, R. K. (1976). Illusory correlation in interpersonal perception: A 
cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12, 
392-407. 
Hu, X., Gawronski, B., & Balas, R. (2017). Propositional versus dual-process accounts of 
evaluative conditioning: I. The Effects of co-occurrence and relational information on 
implicit and explicit evaluations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43, 43, 17–
32 
Johnson, C., & Mullen, B. (1994). Evidence for the accessibility of paired distinctiveness in 
distinctiveness-based illusory correlation in stereotyping. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 20, 65–70. 
ILLUSORY-CORRELATION EFFECTS                 38 
Klauer, K. C., & Meiser, T. (2000) A source-monitoring analysis of illusory correlations. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26,1074-1093. 
Koppehele-Gossel, J., Hoffmann, L., Banse, R., & Gawronski, B. (2020). Evaluative priming as 
an implicit measure of evaluation: An examination of outlier-treatments for evaluative 
priming scores. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 87:103905 
Kurdi, B., & Dunham, Y. (in press). Propositional accounts of implicit evaluation: Taking stock 
and looking ahead. Social Cognition. 
Meiser, T., & Hewstone, M. (2006). Illusory and spurious correlations: Distinct phenomena or 
joint outcomes of exemplar-based category learning? European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 36, 315–336. 
Mullen, B., & Johnson, C. (1990). Distinctiveness based illusory correlations and stereotyping: A 
meta-analytic integration. British Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 11–28. 
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2004). Reducing the influence of extra-personal associations on 
the Implicit Association Test: Personalizing the IAT. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 86, 653-667.  
Payne, B. K., Burkley, M. A., & Stokes, M. B. (2008). Why do implicit and explicit attitude tests 
diverge? The role of structural fit. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 16–
31. 
Payne, B. K., Cheng, C. M., Govorun, O., & Stewart, B. D. (2005). An inkblot for attitudes: 
Affect misattribution as implicit measurement. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 89, 277-293.  
ILLUSORY-CORRELATION EFFECTS                 39 
Ratliff, K. A., & Nosek, B. A. (2010). Creating distinct implicit and explicit attitudes with an 
illusory correlation paradigm. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 721–728. 
Rothermund, K., & Wentura, D. (2004). Underlying processes in the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT): Dissociating salience from associations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 133, 139–165.  
Rudman, L. A. (2004). Sources of implicit attitudes. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 13, 79-82 
Rydell, R. J., & Gawronski, B. (2009). I like you, I like you not: Understanding the formation of 
context-dependent automatic attitudes. Cognition and Emotion, 23, 1118–1152 
Sears, D. O., & Henry, P. J. (2003). The origins of symbolic racism. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 85, 259–75.  
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 220-247 
Van Dessel, P., De Houwer, J., Gast, A., & Smith, C. T. (2015). Instruction-based approach–
avoidance Effects: changing stimulus evaluation via the mere instruction to approach or 
avoid stimuli. Experimental Psychology, 62, 161-169. 
Van Dessel, P., Gawronski, B., & De Houwer, J. (2019). Does explaining social behavior require 
multiple memory systems? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23, 368-369. 
Van Dessel, P., Mertens, G., Smith, C. T., & De Houwer, J. (2017). The mere exposure 
instruction effect: Mere exposure instructions influence liking. Experimental Psychology, 
64, 299-314. 
ILLUSORY-CORRELATION EFFECTS                 40 
Van Dessel, P., Cone, J., Gast, A., & De Houwer, J. (2020). The impact of valenced verbal 
information on implicit and explicit evaluation: the role of information diagnosticity, 
primacy, and memory cueing. Cognition and Emotion, 34, 74-85, 
Wells, C., Reedy, J., Gastil, J., & Lee, C. (2009). Information distortion and voting choices: The 
origins and effects of factual beliefs in initiative elections. Political Psychology, 30, 953-
969. 
Wheeler, S. C., & Petty, R. E. (2001). The effects of stereotype activation on behavior: A review 
of possible mechanisms. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 797–826 
Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology Monographs, 9, 1-27.  
Zhou, H., & Fishbach, A. (2016). The pitfall of experimenting on the web: How unattended 
selective attrition leads to surprising (yet false) research conclusions. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 11, 493-504. 
  
ILLUSORY-CORRELATION EFFECTS                 41 
Tables 
Table 1. Total number of participants who completed Experiment 1 and 2 in the 4 experimental 
conditions as a function of Task Order (IAT/self-report task first) and IAT Order (Block with 
Niffians and positive together first/ Block with Laapians and positive together first). 
  IAT first Self-report first 
  IAT Order 1 IAT Order 2 IAT Order 1 IAT Order 2 
  N  
(% of total) 
N  
(% of total) 
N  
(% of total) 
N  
(% of total) 
Experiment 1       
Niffians majority Positive frequent 186 (12.1%) 196 (12.8%)   
 Negative frequent 194 (12.6%) 198 (12.9%)   
Laapians majority Positive frequent 188 (12.2%) 187 (12.2%)   
 Negative frequent 186 (12.1%) 200 (13.0%)   
Experiment 2       
Niffians majority Positive frequent 92 (6.4%) 89 (6.2%) 96 (6.7%) 87 (6.1%) 
 Negative frequent 91 (6.4%) 101 (7.1%) 82 (5.7%) 95 (6.6%) 
Laapians majority Positive frequent 81 (5.7%) 111 (7.8%) 73 (5.1%) 94 (6.6%) 
 Negative frequent 88 (6.1%) 84 (5.9%) 78 (5.4%) 90 (6.0%) 
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Table 2. Overview of mean IAT, self-report rating and proportion positive scores in Experiments 
1 and 2 and the difference in means between the two Majority Group conditions. 
 Positive frequent Negative frequent 
 Niffians majority Laapians majority Diff Niffians majority Laapians majority Diff 
IAT Exp 1: -0.04 (0.42) 
Exp 2: -0.03 (0.41) 
Exp 1: -0.17 (0.41) 
Exp 2: -0.20 (0.40) 
0.13 
0.17 
Exp 1: -0.05 (0.43) 
Exp 2: -0.05 (0.42) 
Exp 1: -0.17 (0.41) 





Exp 1: 0.02 (1.38) 
Exp 2: 0.03 (1.11) 
Exp 1: -0.37 (1.40) 
Exp 2: -0.19 (1.15) 
0.39 
0.22 
Exp 1: -0.19 (1.38) 
Exp 2: -0.22 (1.17) 
Exp 1: -0.03 (1.40) 





Exp 1: -0.07 (0.22) 
Exp 2: -0.04 (0.20) 
Exp 1: 0.03 (0.23) 
Exp 2: 0.02 (0.20) 
-0.10 
-0.06 
Exp 1: -0.11 (0.22) 
Exp 2: -0.10 (0.22) 
Exp 1: 0.07 (0.20) 
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Table 3. Total number of participants who completed Experiment 3 and 4 in the 4 experimental 
conditions as a function of Task Order (automatic/self-report task first). 
  Automatic evaluation 
task first 
Self-report task first 
  N  
(% of total) 
N  
(% of total) 
Experiment 3       
Niffians majority Positive frequent 165 (11.8%) 138 (9.9%) 
 Negative frequent 187 (13.4%) 156 (11.2%) 
Laapians majority Positive frequent 185 (13.3%) 147 (10.5%) 
 Negative frequent 163 (11.7%) 121 (8.7%) 
Experiment 4       
Niffians majority Positive frequent 221 (14.2%) 196 (12.6%) 
 Negative frequent 190 (12.3%) 191 (12.3%) 
Laapians majority Positive frequent 194 (12.5%) 221 (14.2%) 
 Negative frequent 174 (11.2%) 163 (10.5%) 
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Table 4. Overview of mean AMP, EPT, self-report rating and proportion positive scores in 
Experiments 3 and 4 and the difference in means between the two Majority Group conditions. 
 Positive frequent Negative frequent 
 Niffians majority Laapians majority Diff Niffians majority Laapians majority Diff 
AMP 
EPT 
Exp 3: -0.02 (0.11) 
Exp 4: -2.68 (47.06) 
Exp 3: -0.01 (0.10) 
Exp 4: -3.91 (45.67) 
-0.01 
1.23 
Exp 3: -0.01 (0.09) 
Exp 4: -4.28 (44.95) 
Exp 3: 0.01 (0.09) 





Exp 3: 0.04 (1.22) 
Exp 4: 0.14 (1.23) 
Exp 3: -0.23 (1.13) 
Exp 4: -0.27 (1.33) 
0.27 
0.41 
Exp 3: -0.23 (1.27) 
Exp 4: -0.13 (1.11) 
Exp 3: 0.08 (1.30) 





Exp 3: -0.01 (0.19) 
Exp 4: 0.00 (0.20) 
Exp 3: -0.01 (0.20) 
Exp 4: -0.02 (0.19) 
0.00 
0.02 
Exp 3: -0.05 (0.20) 
Exp 4: -0.05 (0.19) 
Exp 3: 0.04 (0.21) 
Exp 4: 0.02 (0.18) 
-0.09 
-0.07 
 
